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From “Arbitrary” to Arbitration: Using 
ADR’s Popular Favorite to Resolve 
Commercial Marijuana Disputes 
 




Arizona entrepreneurs Michele Hammer and Mike Haile thought they 
were making a smart business decision in August 2010 when they each 
loaned $250,000 to Today’s Health Care II (“THC”), a Colorado-based 
medical marijuana dispensary.1  After all, Colorado’s medical marijuana 
industry was second only to California’s at the time, and California’s 
medical marijuana industry was estimated at $1.3 billion dollars.2  Both 
loan agreements specifically provided that THC would “use the loan 
proceeds for a retail medical marijuana sales and growth center.”3  When 
THC defaulted on its loan obligations, the two lenders brought suit in 
Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court to enforce their agreement.4  
Judge Michael McVey instead dismissed the case, stating that he couldn’t 
enforce the agreement where “[t]he explicitly stated purpose of these loan 
agreements was to finance the sale and distribution of marijuana.  This was 
in clear violation of the laws of the United States.  As such, th[e] contract 
[was] void and unenforceable.”5 
The “harsh result”6 of McVey’s ruling sent a worrisome message to 
individuals in the marijuana industry:  So long as the current treatment of 
                                                 
 * Senior Notes Editor, Hastings Business Law Journal, Volume 14; J.D. Candidate 2018, 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2018; B.A. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 
French Language 2014, Bates College. 
 1. Abellin, $500,000 Medical Marijuana Loan Up In Smoke, ABC NEWS (May 12, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/500000-medical-marijuana-lawsuit-smoke/story?id=16322793 [http:// 
perma.cc/4PER-ZED3].  
 2. Id. 
 3. Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, No. CV2011-051310, 2012 WL 12874349, *1 (Ariz. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 12, 2012). 
 4. Abellin, supra note 1; see also Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arizona Medical-Pot Ruling May 
Reverberate, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (May 9, 2012, 10:06 PM), http://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-
arizona-republic/20120510/281741266445069 [http://perma.cc/JCU7-VEU6]. 
 5. Hammer, 2012 WL 12874349, at *4. 
 6. Ibid. 
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marijuana under the Federal Controlled Substances Act7 remains in effect, 
marijuana dispensaries and those who do business with them will be denied 
access to the courts for relief when a deal goes south—state law 
notwithstanding.8  To remedy this lawless situation, at least while 
legislators sort out the federalism issues, the commercial marijuana 
industry should turn to private arbitration for protection. 
Hammer and Haile, unfortunately, are not alone.  Similar court rulings 
have threatened the undoing of state-level marijuana initiatives.9  Yet 
public support for legalization has risen dramatically over the past several 
decades.10  According to a survey performed by Pew Research Center, 
fifty-three percent of Americans supported some form of legalization in 
2015.11  When Pew performed the same survey a little over three decades 
earlier, only twenty-five percent of Americans supported legalization.12  To 
meet the growing demand, an increasing number of states have enacted 
legislation permitting medical or recreational marijuana use.13 
                                                 
 7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841–65 (2017).  Congress enacted the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) pursuant to the Nixon Administration’s declared national “war on drugs.”  See Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).  The CSA purports to combat drug abuse, prevent the diversion of drugs 
into illicit channels, and eliminate “[t]he illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession 
and improper use of controlled substances.”  21 U.S.C. § 801(1)–(6).  To these ends, “Congress devised 
a closed regulatory system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any 
controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 13. 
 8. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]his Constitution, and the laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  This Clause mandates that state action give way to federal legislation 
where a state law conflicts with a valid act of Congress.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824); 
see also Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F.Supp.2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Even though state law may 
allow for the prescription or recommendation of medicinal marijuana within its borders, to do so is still 
a violation of federal law under the CSA.”). 
 9. See United States v. Scarmazzo, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The use of 
medical marijuana remains unlawful.”); Tracy v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-00487LEK-KSC, 2012 
WL 928186, at *13 (D. Haw, Mar. 16, 2012) (holding that, on summary judgment motion, Court could 
not enforce “Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants” provision of insurance policy because plaintiff’s 
possession and cultivation of marijuana clearly violated federal law); see also Barrios v. County of 
Tulare, No. 1:13-CV01665 AWI GSA, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (holding that 
plaintiff could not recover damages as a result of the confiscation or destruction of marijuana because 
plaintiff had no cognizable property interest in the marijuana); Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011-CV-709, 
2012 WL 7149098 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012). 
 10. See Art Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx [https 
://perma.cc/J89P-H7KJ] (explaining the growing trend for public support of marijuana usage between 
1970 and 2013); see also Majority of Americans Support Legalization of Marijuana — Polls, RT (Apr. 
15, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.rt.com/usa/249765-majority-americans-marijuana-legalization [https:// 
perma.cc/VYQ7-WHMK]. 
 11. Majority of Americans Support Legalization of Marijuana, supra note 10. 
 12. Id. 
 13. In November 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize marijuana for 
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Officially, however, marijuana’s legal status is the same as it has been 
since 1970 — categorically forbidden and subject to criminal penalties.14  
Marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law; its 
manufacture, distribution, possession, and cultivation are strictly prohibited 
pursuant to the Federal Controlled Substances Act.15 
The federal government has repeatedly denied attempts to reschedule 
marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule II drug.16  In 2011, Deputy 
Attorney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum to U.S. attorneys 
stating that “[p]ersons who are in the business of cultivating, selling, or 
distributing marijuana . . . are in violation of the [CSA], regardless of state 
law.”17  Two years later, Cole issued a subsequent memorandum signaling 
a general shift in drug enforcement tactics toward more selective 
prosecution.18  The memo listed eight broadly stated enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
recreational use.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, amended by COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV, § 16; 
Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502, ch. 3, 2013 Wash. Legis. Serv. 28 
(West) (Initiative Measure-Marijuana-Legalization and Regulation); see also Jack Healy, Voters Ease 
Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legalization Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS (Nov. 7, 2012), 
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html 
[https://perma.cc/U24T-4CWH].  Both states now treat marijuana similarly to alcohol — subject to 
taxes and heavy regulation, but nonetheless legal for adult use — and other states are beginning to 
follow their example.  COLO. CONST. amend. LXIV; Washington Marijuana Legalization and 
Regulation, Initiative 502.  In 2014, voters approved similar initiatives to legalize marijuana in 
Washington, D.C., Oregon, and Alaska.  Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize 
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upsho 
t/marijuana-on-the-ballot-in-florida-alaska-oregon-and-dc.html [https://perma.cc/E7NY-FSGS].  The 
District of Columbia and Oregon have since enacted similar legislation.  See State Marijuana Laws 
Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreation 
al.html [https://perma.cc/PEG9-22ME].  To date, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have 
legalized marijuana for either or both medical or recreational purposes.  These states are Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.  See 
Ben Gilbert, One in 5 Americans will soon have access to fully legal marijuana, BUSINESS INSIDER: 
LAW & ORDER (Nov. 14, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/marijuana-in-america-20-
of-americans-can-now-access-legal-weed-2016-11 [https://perma.cc/BXJ2-7FJR], for map of marijuana 
policy in the United States; see generally Marijuana Policy Project, Map of State Marijuana Laws, 
https://www.mpp.org/states/ [https://perma.cc/QTC4-CDDA]. 
 14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812, 841–65 (2012). 
 15. Congress identifies Schedule I drugs as those with (1) “a high potential for abuse,” (2) “no 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and (3) “a lack of accepted safety for 
use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision.”  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). 
 16. See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposition 215, 62 
Fed. Reg. 6164 (1997) (setting forth George W. Bush’s stance of strong federal opposition to all 
marijuana use, including uses permitted under state law). 
 17. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance Regarding the Ogden 
Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use, at 2 (June 29, 2011), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/68589215/Cole-Memo-June-2011 [https://perma.cc/A77S-4VCK]. 
 18. Memorandum from James M. Cole. Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
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priorities.19  Outside the listed priorities, the memo expressed a strong 
deference to state law.20  That same year, President Obama promised not to 
use “Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on th[e] 
issue.”21  The President, however, neither purported to reinterpret the CSA 
nor ruled out federal enforcement in those states that permit or even abet 
illegal activities. 
Judicial refusal to convert such executive statements into binding law 
leaves individuals like Michele Hammer and Mike Haile at the mercy of 
those with whom they do business.  For Hammer and Haile, that meant 
$500,000 out of pocket.  For medical directors of dispensaries, it may mean 
nonpayment for services.  For landlords leasing to dispensaries, it may 
mean fewer options in situations of default.  For investors in dispensaries, it 
may mean more losses than profits.  Unless and until Congress reschedules 
marijuana, where state marijuana laws come into conflict with the CSA, the 
state laws will be preempted and overruled by federal law.22  Attorneys 
representing individuals like Hammer and Haile have not overlooked this 
opportunity.  Marijuana law blogs frequently feature practitioner posts 
exploring possible solutions for the conflict.23  The blogs themselves, 
however, attest to the fact that no one solution sought within the existing 
framework adequately controls for the varying results of different courts 
and different forums.24  This Note proposes that individuals involved in, or 
seeking involvement in, the marijuana industry circumnavigate this 
                                                                                                                 
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685746 
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B7M-HGYR] [hereinafter Cole Memo 2013]. 
 19. Id.  These include: Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue 
from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; preventing the 
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; 
preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking 
of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; preventing the growing of marijuana 
on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana 
production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. 
Cole Memo 2013, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. The Editorial Board, American Mayors: Let Them Smoke Pot, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION 
PAGES (June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/29/opinion/american-mayors-let-them-smok 
e-pot.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R7XP-STJM]; see Cole Memo 2013, supra note 18, at 2 (making 
clear that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) would no longer use valued resources to patrol state 
marijuana dealings). 
 22. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 74, 102–03 (2015). 
 23. See, e.g., Rebecca Millican, Your Cannabis Contract: Is It Worth the Paper It’s Written On?, 
CANNA L. GRP. (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/your-cannabis-contract-is-it-worth-the-
paper-its-written-on [https://perma.cc/5Y2K-QRN4]. 
 24. Millican, supra note 23.  Millican’s own blog corroborates this point. 
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impasse between the federal and state governments by submitting to 
arbitration any dispute arising out of or related to marijuana. 
 
I.  WHY ARBITRATION?  BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
Arbitration25 is popularly touted as the most efficient, inexpensive, 
and definitive method of dispute resolution in the United States.26  The 
method has become so prominent27 some critics even contend arbitration is 
“the new litigation,” increasingly resembling a parallel judicial system.28  
Shortcomings of this system have led to a rise in different forms of 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”),29 although consensual arbitration 
remains a favorite among alternatives.  In 2011, the United States Supreme 
Court, no less, praised the arbitration process for “allow[ing] efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”30  The Court 
exalted, “the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing 
the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”31  Arbitration, 
                                                 
 25. Leading arbitration scholar Thomas Stipanowich remarks that “[a]rbitration is often described 
as everything that civil litigation is not.”  Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 
IND. L.J. 425, 429 (1988).  The American Arbitration Association (AAA) defines arbitration as “ . . . the 
submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision, known as an 
‘award.’”  Using ADR to Resolve Collegiate, Professional, and Sports-Business Disputes, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Using%20A 
DR%20to%20Resolve%20Collegiate%20Professional%20and%20Sport%20Business%20Disputes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AP9F-VYD4].  “Arbitration is the most traditional form of private dispute resolution. 
 . . .  Arbitration is adjudicatory, as opposed to advisory, because of the fact that the arbitrator (usually a 
retired judge or attorney) renders a decision at the end of an arbitration hearing, and that decision is 
final and binding, subject only to a very limited court review.”  Arbitration Defined, JAMS, 
https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-defined/ [https://perma.cc/FR2P-45N3]. 
 26. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE 
DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS (1998), http://digit 
alcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=icrpubs (detailing reasons why 
companies use arbitration); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 25 (defining arbitration 
as a “time-tested, cost-effective alternative to litigation”); LONDON COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration.aspx [https://perma.cc/6UUS-K5D4] 
(ranking the best features of arbitration as including “maximum flexibility for parties . . . ; speed and 
efficiency . . . ; means of reducing delays and counteracting delaying tactics”). 
 27. For example, AT&T acknowledged in a petition for a writ of certiorari that its arbitration 
clauses were embedded in “tens (if not hundreds) of millions” of wireless service agreements.  Reply 
Brief for the Petitioner at 1, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893) 
(U.S. May 3, 2010). 
 28. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8–9 
(2010).  Stipanowich drives his point home by defining arbitration as a “wide-ranging surrogate for 
civil trial.”  Id. at 5. 
 29. See Peter B. Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 134, 
135–36 (1984); see generally James F. Henry, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs 
of the 1980s, 1 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 113 (1985). 
 30. AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344–45. 
 31. Id. at 345; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009) (internal quotations 
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however, is hardly revolutionary.  Aggrieved parties turned to arbitration 
centuries ago to resolve their disputes.32 
The modern era of arbitration began in the 1920s with the passage of a 
New York state statute requiring the enforcement of contractual agreements 
to arbitrate future disputes.33  Acts of similar import were before a number 
of state legislatures when Congress passed federal legislation, modeled 
after the New York Act,34 “to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal 
to enforce agreements to arbitrate.”35 
Enacted in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act addresses centuries of 
judicial hostility to arbitration36 by placing arbitration agreements “upon 
the same footing as other contracts.”37  The origins of this “common law 
hostility toward arbitration”38 apparently lie in “ancient times” when the 
English courts fought “for extension of jurisdiction — all of them being 
opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them of 
jurisdiction.”39  American courts initially followed English practice, 
perhaps just “stand[ing] . . . upon the antiquity of the rule” prohibiting 
arbitration clause enforcement, rather than “upon its excellence or 
                                                                                                                 
omitted). 
 32. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 
265, 265 (1926) (“[Arbitration] deals neither with a novel nor a radical remedy, but with one founded 
upon the experience of centuries.”); Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and 
Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and 
Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144 (2002) (“The use of arbitration began in 
the United States during the colonial period.”); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Revolving Door 
of Justice: Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 861, 865 (2004) (stating that arbitration has been used in the United States “almost from the 
nation’s founding”). 
 33. Cohen, supra note 32, at 266.  For a review of the New York statute, see Berkovitz v. Arbib 
& Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261 (1921). 
 34. Cohen, supra note 32, at 266. 
 35. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Cohen, supra note 32, at 
265 (“By this Act there is reversed the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are revocable at 
will and are unenforceable”); Volt Info. Sci. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (stating that the 
“principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms”). 
 36. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (stating a party “may submit his . . . suit . . . to 
an arbitration . . . .  [However,] agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by 
law are illegal and void”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s 
Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 137 (2002) (commenting that American 
courts viewed arbitration as threatening their power). 
 37. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 96, 68th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)). 
 38. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
 39. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n. 5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (quoting United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 
1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)). 
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reason.”40  The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)41 aims to change this anti-
arbitration rule42 and “to assure those who desire[] arbitration . . . that their 
expectations w[ill] not be undermined by federal judges, . . . by state 
courts[,] or [by] legislatures.”43 
The key statutory provisions embodying this congressional pursuit 
include Section 2,44 which declares that a written provision for arbitration 
“in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of any 
contract;”45 Section 3, requiring courts to stay litigation “upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration;”46 and Section 4, which provides a remedy for a party 
“aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate 
under a written agreement for arbitration.”47  It does so by directing courts 
to compel arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in 
issue.”48  Other relevant sections include Section 9, which details the 
procedures by which a prevailing party may seek to enforce an arbitral 
award,49 and Section 10, which prescribes the procedures by which the 
nonprevailing party may seek to vacate an arbitral award.50  These 
provisions together reflect a broad “national policy favoring arbitration.”51 
Nevertheless, the U.S. judiciary only fully embraced arbitration in the 
1980s after subjecting the Act to decades of searching review.  Indeed, 
early United States Supreme Court decisions evince a high degree of 
                                                 
 40. Id. 
 41. The FAA was originally named the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) 
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).  For further information on the history of the FAA, see 
Haydock, infra note 32, at 148 n.35. 
 42. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218–22 (1985). 
 43. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d. Cir. 1961) 
(Lumbard, J., concurring); see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967) (the Act was designed “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not 
more so”). 
 44. References to sections, unless otherwise indicated, are to the FAA.  Section 2 is considered 
the “primary substantive provision of the Act.”  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 45. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 46. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 47. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
 50. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4). 
 51. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts state laws 
which “require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to 
resolve by arbitration”). 
4_LANDRY NOTE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  12:22 PM 
146 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
skepticism about the ability of arbitration to adequately enforce a party’s 
legal rights.52 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, courts began to reconsider 
arbitration as judges called for “a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration 
process.”53  In Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., for 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
defeated a party’s attempt to avoid the FAA by applying the federal 
framework, rather than local law, to an issue of arbitrability.54  The court 
there based its decision on Section 2 of the FAA, stating that the Act 
created “a rule of substantive law declaring . . . that federal rather than local 
law governs ‘questions of interpretation and construction as well as 
questions of validity, revocability[,] and enforceability of arbitration 
agreements . . . .’”55  Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s order 
compelling the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.56 
Similar decisions signaled a shift in federal judicial sanction for those 
“engaged in interstate transactions [seeking] an expeditious extra-judicial 
process for settling disputes.”57  The Supreme Court validated this choice 
for companies in its seminal 1967 Prima Paint decision.58  Taking into 
                                                 
 52. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) 
(“Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury . . . .  Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial 
instruction on the law [and] need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings 
is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial 
review of a trial”); see also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953). 
 53. Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address, Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic 
Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 79, 94 (1976) (addressing the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (“The Pound Conference”) and recommending 
greater use of “the well-developed forms of arbitration” to settle disputes and remarking that “there is 
nothing incompatible between efficiency and justice.”  Id. at 92.). 
 54. Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d. Cir. 1961).  The 
Metro case involved a painting subcontract for a housing project in Florida.  Id. at 383.  The subcontract 
contained the arbitration clause at issue.  Ibid.  Following performance of the subcontract, petitioners 
sought to compel arbitration in order to recover expenses incurred for work additional to that required 
by the contract.  Id. at 384.  Respondents refused to arbitrate the claims, and petitioners thereupon 
moved for relief under Section 4 of the FAA.  Ibid. 
 55. Metro, 287 F.2d at 385 (quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 
402, 409 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 364 U.S. 801 
(1960)).). 
 56. Metro, 287 F.2d at 385. 
 57. Id. at 387 (Lumbard, J., concurring). 
 58. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (holding that, as a 
matter of federal substantive law, a challenge to the validity of an underlying contract is severable from 
a challenge to the validity of an embedded arbitration clause).  The contract at issue in Prima Paint, 
much as in Metro, contained an arbitration clause requiring the parties to submit any dispute “arising 
out of or relating” to their agreement to settlement by arbitration.  Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 398.  A 
party to the case alleged that the other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, although 
not of the arbitration clause in particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal 
court.  Id. at 398–99. 
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consideration the legislative history of the Act, the Court there confirmed 
that the FAA “is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal 
foundations of ‘control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.”59  
Thus, a challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not 
specifically to the arbitration clause within it, “is for the arbitrators and not 
for the courts” to decide.60  The Court determined that such separability is 
necessary to ensure that “when selected by the parties to a contract, [the 
arbitration procedure] be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in 
the courts.”61 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court issued multiple decisions 
expanding the rubric of the FAA.  In the 1983 decision Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Court emphasized 
that the FAA is a “congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural 
policies to the contrary,” and that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration.”62  A year later in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court 
reiterated that the FAA is applicable in both state and federal courts.63  
Further still, the Court there held that the FAA preempts state law — state 
courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.64  
“[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of 
claim, the analysis is straightforward:  The conflicting rule is displaced by 
the FAA.”65  In the years since Southland, the Court has consistently 
limited the application of challenges under the FAA,66 offering dramatic 
                                                 
 59. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)).  In 
support of this conclusion, the Court wrote: “Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct 
themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate.”  Id. at 
405. 
 60. Id. at 400. 
 61. Id. at 404. 
 62. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (emphasis 
added); Metro, 287 F.2d at 384 (“Irrespective of state court decisions regarding the construction of 
arbitration clauses, all such clauses in contracts coming within the scope of the act must be interpreted 
in the light of federal decisional law.”). 
 63. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 15–16 (1984); see, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 
U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (finding preempted a state statute which rendered unenforceable private 
agreements to arbitrate certain wage collection claims). 
 64. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15–16. 
 65. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011)). 
 66. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) 
(reversing a First Circuit holding that some public policy issues are so critical that they must be left in 
the hands of the courts; ordering that the dispute under review be sent to arbitration; and noting that “we 
are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of 
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute 
resolution”); Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2010) (holding that an arbitrator 
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affirmations of its contemporary faith in arbitration as an effective 
substitute for litigation. 
 
II.  BUCKEYE: AN ILLEGAL AGREEMENT IS STILL A BINDING AND 
ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT 
 
Particularly significant to the enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
the marijuana-industry context, the Court in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. 
v. Cardegna held that an arbitration award is valid and enforceable even 
where the underlying factual circumstances of the dispute involve illegal 
activity.67  In Buckeye, the Court considered whether the rule of 
severability adopted in Prima Paint should apply to a contract that might 
be intrinsically invalid — due, for example, to illegality.68  The Buckeye 
respondents challenged a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure Agreement” 
that allegedly provided for “usurious interest rates” in violation of Florida 
lending and consumer-protection laws.69  Respondents argued that these 
violations rendered the agreement criminal on its face.70  The petitioner 
moved to compel arbitration based on a clause within the agreement 
requiring Respondents to resolve “[a]ny claim, dispute, or controversy . . . 
arising from or relating to this Agreement . . . by binding arbitration.”71  
The trial court denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an 
arbitrator should resolve the respondents’ claim that the agreement was 
illegal and, therefore, void.72  The appellate court reversed, but the Florida 
Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision in turn.73  Florida’s high 
court reasoned that enforcing arbitration provisions contained in an 
allegedly unlawful contract “could breathe life into a contract that not only 
violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.”74  “Florida public policy 
and contract law,” the Florida high court concluded, permit “no severable, 
or salvageable, parts of a contract found illegal and void under Florida 
law.”75 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Buckeye and 
                                                                                                                 
may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 343, 
352 (holding that the FAA’s preemptive effect extended even to grounds traditionally thought to exist 
“at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” rendering invalid California’s Discover Bank 
rule). 
 67. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 444–45. 
 69. Id. at 443. 
 70. Ibid. 
 71. Id. at 442 (quoting the FAA). 
 72. Id.at 442. 
 73. Ibid. 
 74. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (2005). 
 75. Id. at 864. 
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reversed the Florida decision, reaffirming its Southland and Prima Paint 
holdings.76  Heeding Prima Paint’s rule of severability,77 the Court rejected 
the Florida court’s attempt to draw a distinction between void and voidable 
contracts.78  The Court recognized that Prima Paint did not discuss whether 
the challenge at issue would have rendered the contract in that case void or 
voidable.79  Indeed, Prima Paint expressly disclaimed any need to apply 
state severability rules to arbitration agreements.80  Likewise in Southland, 
the Court did not dwell on whether the several challenges involved there — 
“fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
violation of the California Franchise Investment law” — would have 
rendered the contract void or voidable.81 
Instead of drawing a distinction between void and voidable contracts, 
the Court divided challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements into 
two types.82  The first type, the Court explained, specifically challenges the 
validity of an agreement to arbitrate.83  The other type of challenge the 
Court proffered brings into question the contract as a whole, either on some 
ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was 
fraudulently induced) or on the ground that the illegality of one of the 
contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.84  The first type of 
challenge prompts a Southland analysis; the second type of challenge, a 
Prima Paint analysis.  Applying those analyses to the case at bar, the Court 
determined that a challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not 
specifically to an arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.85 
As applied to a dispute arising out of or relating to a commercial 
marijuana transaction, Buckeye provides support for a party to compel 
arbitration even where a challenge exists to the validity of the overall 
agreement under the CSA.  This means that the illegality of part of the 
transaction — that part relating to marijuana — does not operate to nullify 
an agreement to arbitrate.  In this context, Buckeye ensures that, once 
parties enter into an agreement containing arbitration provisions, disputes 
falling within the scope of parties’ agreement be determined by an 
arbitrator rather than a court; this contractual intent must be respected even 
                                                 
 76. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). 
 77. Id. at 449. 
 78. Id. at 446 (commenting on the fact that neither Prima Paint nor Southland turned on whether 
the challenge at issue would render the contract voidable or void). 
 79. Ibid. 
 80. Ibid. 
 81. Ibid. 
 82. Id. at 444. 
 83. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1984). 
 84. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006). 
 85. Southland, 465 U.S. at 4–5. 
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with regard to claims arising under the CSA. 
 
III.  ENFORCEMENT:  THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 
 
Buckeye and the favorable Supreme Court jurisprudence it relied on 
ensure that all courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the FAA and that 
marijuana-industry participants have legal recourse.  These measures would 
be futile if courts could refuse to confirm and enforce an award.  
Fortunately, the FAA precludes states from undermining its objectives by 
supplying mechanisms for the enforcement of arbitration awards: Parties 
may seek out a judicial decree confirming an award, an order vacating an 
award, or an order modifying or correcting an award.86  For example, 
Section 9 of the FAA provides that “any party to the arbitration may apply 
to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon 
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or 
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11.”87  Even where the parties 
fail to specify a confirming court, “such application may be made to the 
United States court in and for the district within which such award was 
made.”88  An application for any of these orders is an action in itself.  The 
application obviates the usual need for a separate contract action to enforce 
or alter an arbitral award in court.89 
The Supreme Court’s consistent treatment of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause90 demands that state courts afford a judgment obtained pursuant to 
these provisions the same res judicata effect that it would receive had a 
court, rather than an arbitrator, issued the judgment.91  Over 225 years ago, 
by the Act of 26th May, 1790, Ch. 11, Congress affirmed the constitutional 
guaranty embodied in the full faith and credit clause, providing that “the 
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in 
                                                 
 86. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11. 
 87. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
 88. See id. 
 89. 9 U.S.C. § 6. 
 90. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). 
 91. According to the Court, the purpose of the clause was to replace the international rule of 
comity with a constitutional duty of states to honor the laws and judgments of sister states.  Estin v. 
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (noting that the full faith and credit clause “substituted a command for 
the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent 
sovereigns”); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (noting that “the clear 
purpose of the full faith and credit clause” was to establish the principal that “a litigation once pursued 
to judgment shall be as conclusive as the rights of the parties in every court as in that where the 
judgment was rendered”). 
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every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was 
pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in 
such state, and none others, could be pleaed [sic] in any other court in the 
United States.”92  As the Court later put it, the effect of this Act brought a 
useful end to state-to-state litigation by making “the local doctrines of res 
judicata . . . a part of the national jurisprudence.”93  Thus, as early as 1813, 
the Court interpreted the Act, for example, as requiring a court in the 
District of Columbia to enforce a judgment rendered in New York.94  The 
next century was no different — in 1908, a Mississippi court was 
compelled to enforce a judgment rendered in Missouri, even though the 
Missouri judgment was allegedly based on a misapprehension of 
Mississippi law.95  Recent decisions of the Court maintain that the clause 
imposes a duty on state courts to give another state court’s judgment the 
same effect that the issuing court would give it.96  Judgments of one court 
thereby gain “nationwide force” for “claim and issue preclusion (res 
judicata) purposes.”97 
In the context of the marijuana industry, once an arbitration award is 
given the force of a state court judgment, it gains nationwide force — no 
matter allegations of the underlying agreement’s purported illegalities. 
The cumulative effect of this long legal history should offer members 
of the marijuana industry a realistic possibility of legal security and equity.  
No more may a party to a contract for marijuana fail to perform under that 
contract and escape the consequences.  Insofar as the contract incorporates 
some agreement to arbitrate, a party may be forced to perform on a contract 
to which the party agreed and received a benefit, even where the disputed 
contract violates federal law.  An arbitrator, unlike a judge in a court of law 
or equity, will enforce, revoke, or rescind a contract for marijuana as the 





                                                 
 92. Hampton v. M’Connel, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818) (Marshall, J.). 
 93. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963). 
 94. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 484 (1813) (“[T]he constitution contemplated a power in 
congress to give a conclusive effect to such judgments.”). 
 95. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908). 
 96. V.L. v. E.L. 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016) (“[The Full Faith and Credit] Clause requires each 
State to recognize and give effect to valid judgments rendered by the courts of its sister States.”); 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges States 
only to accord the same force to judgments as would be accorded by the courts of the State in which the 
judgment was entered.”); see also Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986). 
 97. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
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IV.  PROPOSAL: A MODEL ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FOR THE 
MARIJUANA INDUSTRY 
 
Under the terms of the FAA and the foregoing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, a party may submit any dispute to arbitration that arises out 
of or relates to a commercial-marijuana transaction without fear of the risks 
associated with contravening the CSA.98  Beyond the FAA and Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, policies propounded by the leading ADR 
organization, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), support a 
party’s ability to choose an industry-specific arbitrator, the site of the 
arbitration, and the law to govern the dispute.99  Such choices further 
reduce the uncertainty involved in litigating the same dispute under state 
law.  Through careful drafting of arbitration terms, then, the marijuana 
industry and all involved can find the freedom to seek out fair and equitable 
redress within the law. 
To illustrate, I suggest, with commentary, the following Model 
Arbitration Agreement for the Marijuana Industry: 
 
Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to 
this agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, 
interpretation, legality, issues of public policy or validity thereof, 
including the determination of the scope or applicability of this 
agreement to arbitrate, shall be determined exclusively by 
arbitration in [forum State]. 
 
Commentary to provision (1): 
This provision implements the guarantee of validity provided by 
Section 2 of the FAA.100  This language has been tested by the courts and 
held to comport with the liberal policy in favor of arbitration embodied in 
the FAA.101  Further, the holdings in Prima Paint, Southland, and Buckeye, 
instruct that arbitrability goes before an arbitrator first.102  As such, 
commercial-marijuana contracts containing a similar provision should be 
                                                 
 98. See supra Parts I, II & III. 
 99. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION, adr.org/commercial [https://perma.cc/S438-45R8]. 
 100. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 101. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 385 (2d. Cir. 1961) 
(“The federal policy [is] to construe liberally arbitration clauses.”); see also Lawrence Co. v. 
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (1959) (“[Any] doubts as to the construction of the Act 
ought to be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration.”); Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 421 (1967) (“Today, without expressly saying so, the Court 
does precisely what the Judge Medina did in Robert Lawrence.”).  
 102. See supra Parts I & II. 
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reviewed and resolved, in the first place, by arbitration.  
 
The arbitration shall be exclusively administered by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) pursuant to its 
Arbitration Rules in effect at the time any party submits a claim to 
the AAA. 
 
The AAA Arbitration Rules applicable to the claim(s) are 
expressly incorporated herein by reference and form a part of the 
arbitration agreement between the parties. 
 
Commentary to provisions (2) and (3): 
These provisions designate the organization that will administer the 
arbitration and the rules that will govern, as well as incorporate the 
designated rules into the contract.  These provisions choose the AAA as the 
administrating body and source of the rules but, just as well, could choose a 
different, industry-specific source. 
Parties may wish to apply rules specially adapted to commercial-
marijuana disputes.  Although marijuana groups have yet to propose special 
arbitration rules, examples of industry- and dispute-specific rules can be 
found in the AAA’s specially adapted rules for the resolution of 
construction industry, consumer, and employment disputes.103 
 
The parties submit and consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the state courts in [forum City, State], to compel arbitration, to 
confirm an arbitration award or order, or to handle other court 
functions exclusively in accordance with the [forum State’s 
relevant Arbitration Act]. 
 
The parties may seek recognition and enforcement of any 
[forum State] state court judgment confirming an arbitration 
award or order in any U.S. state court or in any court outside the 
United States and its territories. 
 
Commentary to provisions (4) and (5): 
                                                 
 103. See, e.g., Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, adr.org/construction [https://perma.cc/8TX7-HWVQ]; Consumer 
Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, adr.org/consumer [https://perma.cc/8AL4-
553J]; Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION, adr.org/employment [https://perma.cc/M4V2-2VVQ].  The AAA publishes more 
specialized rules, such as those dedicated to domain-name, healthcare, international, wireless-industry, 
and Olympic-sport disputes.  See AAA Court- and Time-Tested Rules and Procedures, AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, https://www.adr.org/active-rules [https://perma.cc/4HSJ-7VDR]. 
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These provisions should be adopted to ensure that the prevailing party 
has a means of enforcing an arbitration award in a court of law.  The 
provisions thus reinforce Section 9 of the FAA, which establishes the 
jurisdiction and procedure for the confirmation of an arbitration award in 
court.104  The Supreme Court’s consistent treatment of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause guarantees enforcement of a valid arbitration award from one 
state to the next.105 
 
The parties expressly waive any right of removal to the United 
States federal courts, and the parties expressly waive any right to 
compel arbitration, to confirm any arbitral award, or seek any aid 
or assistance of any kind in the United States federal courts. 
 
Commentary to provision (6): 
This provision precludes parties from seeking the protection of the 
CSA in a federal court by foreclosing defensive attempts to invoke a right 
of removal.  Thus, this provision operates as a forum selection clause, 
confining the forum to the selected arbitration.  By this provision, the 
parties functionally waive their right to remove to federal court where a 
judge would apply the CSA, thereby voiding the parties’ underlying 
contract. 
Practitioners have similarly suggested attorneys draft forum selection 
clauses requiring that marijuana-related litigation take place only in state 
court.106  Pursuant to Section 1441(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, 
a defendant may remove a case originally brought in state court to federal 
court in the district where the suit is pending if the claim provides original 
jurisdiction in federal courts.107  If the defendant comes from, operates its 
principal place of business in, or is incorporated in a state other than that of 
the plaintiff, the defendant could strategically invoke removal jurisdiction 
as a defensive strategy.108  Once in federal court, a federal judge would 
apply the “laws that every U.S. judge swears to uphold”109 — federal law 
                                                 
 104. 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on 
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 595 (1993). 
 107. Ibid. 
 108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2017) (defining when federal courts have original diversity 
jurisdiction).  A marijuana-related contract will not likely involve any federal questions on its face, and 
thus, removal will not likely be asserted on the basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  See Brianna 
J. Fuller, Note, III. Federal Question Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1443, 1466–67 (2004) (“A 
federal court will only have federal question jurisdiction when a substantial federal question appears on 
the face of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 109. In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 854 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015). 
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— leaving the plaintiff without means of redress.  Practitioners can 
anticipate and preempt this strategy by bargaining for a forum selection 
clause that waives both parties’ right to remove.   
Unfortunately, this drafting solution is not an absolute solution.  
Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, in which a state court judge enforced 
the CSA, suggests that removing to federal court might not always be 
necessary to succeed defensively in a marijuana-related suit. 110  Whether in 
state or federal court, the odds remain stacked against individuals involved 
in commercial marijuana ventures even if such individuals operate their 
businesses legally, under state law. 
 
The laws of the state of [forum State], including the [forum 
State’s relevant Arbitration Act], shall apply exclusively as the 
laws governing this arbitration agreement between the parties, 
with the sole exception of the [certain forum State law provisions], 
which shall not apply.  The parties may, however, choose a 
different substantive contract law or other laws to govern the main 
contract containing this arbitration agreement.  In the event the 
parties have included a separate provision in their contract 
providing for a state, country, or international law to apply, unless 
otherwise expressly agreed upon, such provision shall be 
interpreted to import rights and obligations of the parties outside 
the arbitration agreement. 
 
Commentary to provision (7): 
This choice of law provision allows parties to determine the law 
applicable to their contract.  Parties should elect to apply laws from states 
with legislation legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, or both, to 
further avoid conflict with the CSA. 
 
Notwithstanding any agreement by the parties to apply a 
different law to the main contract containing this arbitration 
agreement, any principles of public policy applied by the 
arbitrators shall consist exclusively of the [forum State]’s relevant 
public policy, including those specific state statutes. 
 
Commentary to provision (8): 
This provision precludes arbitrators from invoking public policy to 
render the contract void and unenforceable.  Such a provision relies on 
                                                 
 110. See Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, No. CV2011-051310, 2012 WL 12874349 (Ariz. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 12, 2012). 
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applicable state principles of public policy, such as those enacted in 
Colorado and Oregon, for interpretation.111  For example, under Colorado 
state code effective May 2013, “[i]t is the public policy of the state of 
Colorado that a contract is not void or voidable as against public policy if it 
pertains to lawful activities” related to the state laws legalizing marijuana 
distribution and consumption.112  Oregon’s legislature has adopted a similar 
act: “No contract shall be unenforceable on the basis that manufacturing, 
distributing, dispensing, possessing, or using marijuana is prohibited by 
federal law.”113  A party that brings suit under these auspices might come 
across a judge willing to overlook the CSA and enforce the parties’ 
contract according to general contract principles.  
 
An arbitrator exceeds his or her powers by voiding or 
refusing to enforce any contracts or arbitration agreements 
between the parties based solely on the cannabis-related nature of 
the contract. 
 
Commentary to provision (9): 
An arbitrator must strictly agree to enforce the terms of the parties’ 
contract.  The United States Supreme Court praises arbitration for this 
reason, noting in particular that “[i]t can be specified . . . that the decision 
maker be a specialist in the relevant field.”114  At least one practitioner 
suggests attorneys openly acknowledge the illegality of their parties’ 
contract in traditional forums to similarly bind judges.115 
Many in the industry are wary of such tactics; should the strategy fail, 
the consequences are costly.116  When California’s largest cannabis 
company CannaCraft decided to emerge from the “gray market” and “shed 
[its] clandestine past,” it faced a loss of $500,000 in cash, $3 million worth 
of machinery, and $1.5 million worth of cannabis products after 100 
officers and agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration raided its 
facilities in June of 2016.117  Only a month earlier, CannaCraft had hosted 
nearly 50 lawmakers and regulators from Sacramento to showcase its 
                                                 
 111. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-601 (2013); see also Control, Regulation, and Taxation of 
Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 1, § 12. 
 112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-601 (2013). 
 113. Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 
1, § 12. 
 114. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011). 
 115. See Rebecca Millican, Crafting a Marijuana Business Contract That Will Stand up in Court, 
CANNA L. GRP.  (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cannalawblog.com/crafting-a-marijuana-business-contract 
-that-will-stand-up-in-court [https://perma.cc/69GG-X7LF]. 
 116. See Fuller, supra note 108. 
 117. Ibid. 
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compliance efforts and “change people’s image of what a cannabis 
company looked like.”118  CannaCraft’s plight explains the industry’s 
reluctance to “come out into the open” and acknowledge the illegality of 
marijuana-related ventures to traditional adjudicators.119 
 
If one or more provisions of this agreement, including the 
arbitration clause, is for any reason held to be unenforceable or 
invalid, then such provisions will be deemed severable from the 
remaining provisions of this agreement and will in no way affect 
the validity or enforceability of such other provisions or the rights 
of the parties hereunder. 
 
Commentary to provision (10): 
This provision is valid and enforceable pursuant to the holdings in 
Prima Paint, Southland, and Buckeye, discussed above.120 
 
In addition, if any provision of this agreement (or portion 
thereof, including the arbitration agreement) is determined by a 
court to be unenforceable as drafted by virtue of the duration, 
scope, extent, character, or legality of any obligation contained 
therein, the parties acknowledge that it is their intention that such 
provision (or portion thereof) shall be construed in a manner 
designed to effectuate the purposes of such provision to the 
maximum extent enforceable under applicable law. 
 
In the event the right to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or 
controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement is rendered 
invalid or unenforceable, the dispute, claim, or controversy arising 
out of or relating to this agreement shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the state courts in the [forum City, State], unless 
otherwise agreed upon by the parties. 
 
Commentary to provisions (11) and (12): 
 
These provisions reinforce the terms set forth in provision six.  That 
is, the provisions anticipate that an agreement intended to be enforced in 
arbitration, once removed to federal court or subjected to federal law, might 
fall prey to the terms of the CSA and doctrines of illegality.  Consequently, 
these provisions serve as a preventive measure against enforcement of the 
                                                 
 118. Ibid. (quoting Dennis Hunter, a founder of CannaCraft). 
 119. Ibid. 
 120. See supra Parts I & II. 
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CSA in the event the dispute is removed from arbitration to the traditional 
court system by directing the litigation to state court. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The combination of these key provisions offers the possibility of legal 
stability and regularity to parties involved in the marijuana industry.  
Although such protection comes in the form of enforceable contracts and 
industry-specific dispute resolution procedures and standards, rather than 
public law, the marijuana industry will still be able to achieve the 
legitimacy afforded to it by citizens of legalizing states.  The parties, bound 
by these provisions, will find in arbitration the fair dispute resolution 





Although state support for the legalization of both recreational and 
medical marijuana has risen substantially since the passage of California’s 
Compassionate Use Act in 1996,121 the federal government remains 
adamant about marijuana’s status under the federal Controlled Substances 
Act.  Incoming administrations may continue to outline a program of 
selective enforcement for prosecutors, but members of the judicial branch 
are prohibited from joining in such agendas.  Judges will continue to 
enforce the CSA, at least until Congress legislates otherwise.  Thus, 
individuals looking to capitalize on the booming commercial marijuana 
industry risk being denied access to justice in the U.S. court systems.  
Rather than gamble on the government turning a blind eye to objectively 
illegal activity, marijuana industry members should contract for effective 
dispute resolution by the incorporation of arbitration provisions.  The 
provisions proposed draw on the success and favorable reception of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  For the time being, therefore, the best way for 
private parties to approach the impasse between the federal and state 
governments is not to actually solve the impasse, but rather to resort to this 
favorite among forms of alternative dispute resolution to ensure the success 
of the marijuana industry going forward. 
 
                                                 
 121. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2017). 
